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This paper investigates the benefits of banks’ direct investment in foreign subsidiaries and 
branches for non-financial multinationals. The paper builds on the literature on international 
banks which has primarily focused on the implications for host countries, rather than for its 
international clients, and on the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI), which 
emphasizes significant costs of investment. Using a new detailed data set of non-stationary 
sector-level outward FDI, this paper finds that the volume of FDI by home market banks 
boosts FDI by non-financial firms from the same home market. Domestic and third-country 
foreign banking provide imperfect substitutes, especially in countries that are corrupt or have 
weak rule of law. The result rests on banks’ FDI in local branches and subsidiaries rather than 
cross-border lending. These findings are consistent with a role for home market multinational 
banks in intermediating information asymmetry in opaque foreign markets. The sale of a 
major international bank to third-country counter parties during the recent crisis may thus 
result in persistently lower volumes of outward FDI from the bank’s home market. 
JEL-Code: F210, G210, O160, C330. 
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1.  Introduction 
The recent crisis provides a new episode to the intense debate on the benefits and risks of 
financial globalization. It has turned public opinion against too-big-to-fail multinational 
banks, because saving them has turned out costly for taxpayers. However, this paper argues 
that one under-appreciated benefit of large international banks is their role in facilitating 
investment in foreign markets. In particular, firms wishing to expand abroad through foreign 
direct investment may find the services offered by multinational banks essential to overcome 
the market frictions and information asymmetries associated with foreign investment. While 
conventional wisdom has it that banks follow customers abroad, this paper provides, to the 
best of my knowledge, the first evidence that the presence of foreign banks subsequently 
boosts foreign investment by non-financial firms, especially if they originate from the same 
home market. It therefore makes sense for a well known British bank to advertise as 'the 
world's local bank', but more so for its British clients. 
The complex nature of foreign direct investment (FDI) suggests that only the most productive 
firms can successfully invest abroad on their own, while many other firms may benefit from 
the knowledge acquired by earlier investors, in particular by banks. The spread of FDI across 
countries with various institutions implies that multinationals have to deal with varying 
degrees of investor protection and market frictions. Financial intermediaries and financial 
markets could play an important role in overcoming these frictions because of their 
specialized ability to lower transaction costs and overcome information asymmetries. The 
range of investment decisions a multinational has to make include deciding on which country 
to invest in, whether to make a greenfield investment or to buy an existing foreign firm, 
finding a suitable potential subsidiary and deciding on the share of ownership. The 
investment itself will entail transaction costs and call for optimal financing through host, 
home or internal credit markets while information asymmetries arise from institutional 
differences between the countries, differences about corporate culture, valuation of the target 
firm, sourcing of inputs, and sharing of technology. Besides financing projects directly, 
providing diversification of risk and offering cross-border payment services, banks specialize 
in acquiring and processing information about the firms they lend to and in addition they are 
well equipped to monitor investment projects. The fixed costs of engaging in relatively 
complex FDI and firms' heterogeneous productivity sort firms into domestic producers, 
exporters and those engaging in FDI in Helpman et al. (2004). Banks may be able to lower   3 
the costs of FDI and thereby widen the range of firms which is productive enough to invest 
abroad, and in addition increase the pool and quality of investment opportunities. 
Using a detailed panel of sector level outward FDI, this paper finds that the presence of home 
banks in foreign host countries boost the volume of FDI undertaken by firms from the same 
home country. The evidence suggests that banks are an important catalyser of FDI by non-
financial multinationals especially in countries that suffer from investor risk due to weak rule 
of law or corruption. On average, a one standard deviation year-on-year increase in the stock 
of home origin banking FDI (of about 60%) leads, if permanent, to 24% more non-financial 
foreign direct investment from the same country, in the long run. This effect is even larger for 
the most corrupt and lawless countries. These findings are robust to allowing explicitly for 
banking FDI endogeneity, non-stationarity of FDI, and sample selection bias. Also, banks' 
direct investment in branches and subsidiaries is more beneficial than the volume of cross-
border and local lending, and third-country and host banks provide only an imperfect 
substitute. The sectors that benefit more from home banking also tend to rely more on banks 
for external financing and invest in firms belonging to sectors with more distinct sub-sectors. 
Lastly, these results are independent of the possibility that firms use banks with the best 
match in country coverage with respect to the firm's operations.  
These findings suggest several channels through which banks create more and better 
investment opportunities for foreign firms. There is stronger support for those related to firm 
level information asymmetries and bridging institutional distance, than for those related to 
direct lending or organising internal capital markets, although they cannot be ruled out. 
Intermediation by banks lowers the cost and increases the success rate of investment.  
While this paper investigates the effects of international banking on FDI, the literature on 
multinational banking has mostly focused on the implications for host countries (Goldberg, 
2009). The main areas of research have been the transmission of shocks, financial sector 
technology spillovers which improves the efficiency of host banks, improved local asset 
allocation and its positive effect on growth (for example because foreign banks suffer less 
from political influence), and weak evidence for improved institutional development which 
may arise as foreign banks introduce better corporate governance. Kose et al. (2009) 
emphasize that financial globalization has probably more 'collateral' effects such as those 
mentioned above than direct effects through capital accumulation and portfolio 
diversification, although "work needs to be done on how countries can best exploit the 
‘‘potential collateral benefits’’ of globalization" (p.50). If banks facilitate other direct   4 
investment, than this is an additional collateral benefit of financial globalization. Although 
the evidence on direct growth effects of foreign direct investment is mixed
1, it has positive 
effects on investment.
2 This paper aims to add to this literature by shifting the focus to the 
benefits of multinational banking to other international firms, motivated by the premise that 
countries benefit from FDI.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 links the related literature to possible channels 
through which banking FDI may affect non-financial FDI. Section 3 describes the estimation 
strategy and Section 4 the data. Section 5 addresses non-stationarity of FDI and separates the 
long and short-run determinants of FDI. In Section 6 banking FDI is instrumented with 
regulatory reform to identify the main effect. Sections 7 and 8 establish that home banking is 
more important than third-country foreign banking or cross-border lending, especially in 
risky markets. Section 9 presents results at the sector level, while Section 10 uses the results 
to estimate the effect of the recent sale of a major international bank on future FDI. The last 
section concludes and revisits the main mechanisms through which banking intermediation 
facilitates foreign direct investment. 
 
2.  How do banks intermediate foreign direct investment?  
Related literature and the evidence in this paper appeal to four arguments through which 
investment in foreign markets is made easier by the presence of banks. Taken together, these 
predict that foreign banking should increase investment by non-financial foreign firms. These 
are that bank relationships may: (i) increase the size and quality of the pool of potential 
affiliates; (ii) bridge the institutional distance between home and host firms; (iii) help to 
efficiently organize internal capital markets; (iv) provide direct financing. The first three 
information-based services could also be supplied by specialized service firms other than 
banks. However, if they are (strategic) complements to lending, banks' main source of 
income, then banks are the more likely suppliers (see e.g. Spence (1976) for a general 
treatment). The results reveal that the first two channels which relate to information 
asymmetries are somewhat more likely than those related to direct lending or organising 
                                                 
1 A related literature stresses the benefits of general financial development. Empirical work at the 
cross-country level has shown that financial development raises growth rates in sectors that are more 
dependent on external funding (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Alfaro et al. (2004) show that FDI has only 
a positive effect on growth in combination with a higher level of financial development.  
2 Javorcik (2004) for example finds compelling evidence of positive productivity spillovers of FDI on 
local firms.     5 
internal capital markets. Because acquiring information takes time, such effects will be more 
beneficial beyond the short run. 
A firm wishing to expand abroad faces several investment decisions which, independent of 
whether expansion is horizontal, vertical or mixed
3, have to deal with information 
asymmetries between the parent and the investment opportunity. Although the multinational 
initiates the search based on technological requirements it cannot easily assess other 
dimensions of the target firm necessary for successful investment. Such are for example 
financial soundness, corporate governance and valuation.  
It appears natural to assume that there are search costs for finding suitable offshoring 
subsidiaries.
4 Risk of failure makes it worthwhile to find a trustworthy affiliate and because 
banks lend to firms they can assess the likelihood of their misbehaviour. For example, some 
types of asymmetry, such as the degree of contract enforcement and how relationship-specific 
investments are, determine whether the firm engages in an ownership relationship with the 
affiliate (offshoring) as opposed to an arm's length relationship (outsourcing) in Grossman 
and Helpman (2002). Grossman and Helpman (2005) allow for explicit technology related 
search costs incurred by the multinational for finding outsourcing partners across countries. 
At the same time, a target firm may be hesitant to convey too much proprietary information 
in the process, information which its own bank already possesses as part of a lending 
relationship. This predicts a positive effect of the size of home bank involvement through 
local offices in host markets on FDI, which allows information collection on a larger pool of 
potential subsidiaries and generate better opportunities. This effect should be stronger for 
more opaque markets and firms. Both effects are confirmed the results in this paper. The 
banking literature emphasises the importance of physical proximity between firms and 
lenders for effective monitoring and collection of soft information (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 
                                                 
3 To explain the pattern of foreign direct investment across countries, models of FDI have mostly 
focussed on the spatial organization between parent firms and affiliates in which local production cost 
advantages are traded off with transportation costs. High transportation costs predict horizontal FDI to 
serve the local market by means of local production instead of costly trade (Markusen, 1984) while 
significant production cost advantages predict vertical FDI where the final good is shipped back to 
home market consumers (Helpman, 1984). Mixed models such as export-platform FDI occur if 
multinationals use horizontal FDI to sell in the host market and in neighboring countries in addition to 
the home market (Ekholm et al., 2007), while export-fragmentation FDI allows fragmentation of the 
production process by producing through intermediaries in different countries, and shipping the final 
good back to the parent or another country (Yeaple, 2003). 
4 Neary (2009) notes that mergers and acquisitions constitute by far the largest part of the value of 
foreign direct investment, which are encouraged by falling trade costs, unlike pure greenfield 
horizontal FDI.    6 
and 2002). The alternative of arm's length lending relies mostly on hard information, which is 
the type of information that is relatively easier to acquire and more accessible for MNEs as 
well. Possibly the best way to gain local soft knowledge on firms is by acquisition of or joint 
ventures with existing local banks. If this channel is operating cross-border lending should be 
less important than FDI by banks. This is indeed supported by the data. The idea that distance 
related agency and informational costs are very substantial for non-financial multinationals is 
suggested by the fact the even banks face these costs (Mian, 2006). Also Berger et al. (2001) 
find that South American foreign banks are more likely to lend to small Argentine businesses 
than other foreign banks. Arguably, these effects should be stronger for non-financial MNEs 
which do not specialize in overcoming agency and information transaction costs. 
Monitoring after investment could be an additional advantage offered by banks. In Antràs et 
al. (2009) credit constraints, relationship specific investments and weak investor protection 
create the need to monitor investments, leading to vertical integration if monitoring is done 
by parent firms. They find for a sample of US multinationals that while the share of 
ownership is indeed decreasing in the level of investor protection, the scale of operations is 
nonetheless increasing in investor protection.
5 In their model firms are assumed to be better 
monitors than banks, leading to similar conclusions when banks also monitor investment. 
However, the model is inconclusive for low levels of protection and unless the activities are 
very specialized banks may well be better at monitoring. Also information disclosure affects 
foreign investment. Kroszner et al. (2006) find that the disproportional negative effect that 
banking crises have on firms that depend on external finance (through the credit channel) is 
attenuated for less opaque firms with better information disclosure. In Beck (2002) financial 
intermediation arises due to information asymmetries and financial intermediaries incur 
search costs when channelling savings to entrepreneurs. Financial development is modelled 
as lowering the search costs and thus increasing the supply of external finance in the 
economy. As a provider of capital a multinational enterprise (MNE) faces similar constraints. 
However, because there is usually no pooling of capital by multiple MNEs and no risk 
sharing the costs will be higher, making intermediation relatively more important.  
                                                 
5 Claessens and Laeven (2003) show that the security of property rights has as large an effect on asset 
allocation and firm growth as financial development does. Lack of property rights induce firms to 
over-invest in tangible capital which is easier to protect from competitors. Weak contract enforcement 
also results in under-investment and specialization in products that require less relationship-specific 
investments (Nunn, 2007).   7 
Secondly, banks may help to decrease institutional distance between subsidiaries and MNEs 
at the country level, where distance can be geographical, cultural, hierarchical and 
institutional or relate to differences in tax treatment between the destination country and the 
firm's home country. This channel predicts, consistent with this paper's findings, that banks 
from the same origin country are more important for foreign investment than similar services 
offered by either domestic host country banks or other foreign banks, and more so in 
relatively difficult host countries as measured by corruption and rule of law. The more 
involved a home bank is in the local market, the easier it will be to bridge these measures of 
distance. In addition, soft information through banks' direct investment should be more 
beneficial than hard information collected for cross-border lending.  
The third channel relates to the internal financial organization of the multinational, which 
involves optimal capital allocation across affiliates and efficient payment services. Desai et 
al. (2004) find evidence that the financial organization of multinationals' activities is affected 
by depth of local credit markets, especially if creditor rights are weak. Local bankruptcy laws 
prevail such that local creditor rights matter more in the case of disputes, resulting in higher 
local interest rates. Foreign affiliates then depend heavily on the MNE's internal capital 
market for their financing. Banks which are familiar with the firm's operations and local 
imperfections in the external capital market may be able to help arrange financing within 
multinationals in the most efficient way, especially if institutions are weak. Also, Manova et 
al. (2011) find that firms operating in an environment of relatively underdeveloped local 
credit markets who can rely on foreign parents for funding export larger volumes of a broader 
range of products to more countries. FDI is therefore a more productive organizational 
structure over arm's length relationships in sectors which depend on external capital or which 
have fewer collateralizable assets. Similarly, Argentinian firms are more likely to be foreign 
owned when they depend on external finance (Bustos, 2011). This suggests that there is a role 
for financial intermediation by banks. A larger positive effect of banking FDI in more opaque 
markets by home rather than third-country or host banks also supports this channel. However, 
there is also some evidence that sectors which rely on external finance benefit more from 
home banking, although this could also capture that some sectors have more banking 
relationships. 
The fourth channel works through direct financing of multinationals' foreign operations by 
banks. For example, Klein et al. (2002) show that firms initiate fewer FDI projects if their 
home bank is in distress. Banking crises limit credit supply which multinationals need to   8 
finance investments. If funding is predominantly provided by its home bank than home 
country banking FDI to should have a stronger effect than third-country banking FDI, 
although firms may draw from both sources. However, in that case a positive effect of the 
volume of local lending is also expected. The latter is however not supported by the data. 
 
3.  Estimating the effect of home banking on non-financial direct investment 
The main goal is to identify and estimate the effect of home origin banking in foreign 
countries on non-financial direct investment from the same source country. The following 
components of bank assets will be allowed to separately affect investment by non-financial 
firms: the balance sheet value of banks' FDI in branches and subsidiaries, local currency 
lending, and foreign currency lending. The data for FDI is more detailed (see Section 4) than 
for the volume of lending, so the focus is initially on the former.  
The following baseline model captures the effect of home banking on non-financial FDI: 
  , 1 ln ln
NF B
it it i t i t it FDI FDI c v b g t - = + + + + X   (1) 
where ln
NF
it FDI is the log of the stock of outward non-financial FDI in year t to host country 
i,  , 1 ln
B
i t FDI -  is the log of the stock of outward banking FDI in year t-1 and country i, and γ is 
the main parameter of interest. The matrix X contains a constant and exogenous regressors 
such as market potential and market potential in surrounding countries. The ci are country 
fixed effects which may be correlated with the X and which will absorb any unobserved and 
observed time-invariant regressors, such as distance and average institutional quality. The τt 
are year fixed effects. There are several potential issues with estimating this equation. These 
are: (i) endogeneity of banking FDI; (ii) non-stationarity of FDI; (iii) cross-sectional 
dependence in the form of spatial auto-correlation.  
Although banking FDI is allowed to affect non-financial FDI only with a delay of one year, 
banks may be forward looking and following their domestic customers abroad. Banks may 
also invest abroad to grow beyond the limits posed by saturated domestic markets. Partly 
unobserved factors that determine non-financial FDI such as the quality of institutions may 
also determine banking FDI. This source of endogeneity, and the possibility of reverse 
causality, requires an instrument that predicts the amount of banking FDI but is unrelated to 
the amount of non-financial FDI.   9 
Secondly, Figures 1 and 2 in the next Section clearly show that outward FDI is trending 
upwards. Simple OLS on the levels of FDI will lead to inconsistent estimates if the variables 
are non-stationary. Testing for non-stationarity and for cointegration is therefore necessary. If 
the variables follow a common trend the equation of interest can be estimated in error-
correction form, adding lags, and first differences for the short run effects.   
Thirdly, models of FDI predict that distance, host market potential and the investment and 
market potential in neighbouring countries determine FDI (i.e. Blonigen et al., 2007). Just as 
is the case with time lags, third-country effects in the form of spatial lags can bias the 
estimates if not properly accounted for, which calls for testing for spatial dependence in both 
the dependent and independent variables.  
To deal with the first problem the following two stage model is estimated: 
  1 , 1 1 1 ln ln
NF B
it it i t i t it FDI FDI c v b g t - = + + + + X   (2) 
where: 
  2 2 2 2 ln
B
it it it i t it FDI Z c v b d t = + + + + X .  (3) 
The variable Z is an (excluded) instrument that determines the amount of banking FDI, which 
is provided by a new database of financial reforms (Abiad et al., 2010) as described in more 
detail in Section 6.  
Furthermore, since Section 5 further down establishes that the variables are cointegrated, 
equation (2) can be estimated in error-correction form to separate the long run from the short 
run effects:  
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To test for cross-sectional dependence equations (2) and (4) are augmented with a spatial lag 
of the dependent variable,  1 ln
NF
it FDI r W , where the matrix W is a row-standardized matrix 
containing the inverse of distance between all pairs of countries. Because of the spatial 
term 1 r  the estimates are based on ML instead of OLS as explained in more detail in 
Appendix B.  
Robustness Appendix D deals with several additional potential sources of bias. These do not 
affect the main message, but show that long run effects are more robust than short run effects. 
These are: (iv) left censoring of the dependent variable and possible sample selection bias; (v)   10 
left censoring of the main explanatory variable which could be non-random with respect to 
the equation of interest; (vi) the possibility that the panel is unbalanced due to endogenous 
entry and exit.  
 
4.  Data on sector level outward FDI 
To test the main hypotheses data is required on outward FDI for investments done by 
multinationals in the non-financial and in the banking sector for as many countries as 
possible. Since available FDI data sets either have large gaps in them for reasons of 
confidentiality or do not contain much sector level FDI, this paper uses a unique dataset on 
outward FDI from the Netherlands collected by the central bank. This dataset benefits from 
all firms being legally required to report their current-account transactions, including foreign 
investment flows and positions collected via banks, stating the balance sheet current value of 
FDI stocks and flows. Aggregate FDI and disaggregated FDI data for several broad sectors 
and large countries are available through the central bank’s website.
6 At the more detailed 
level of specific countries and sectors, the data is confidential and accessible by permission. 
Home banking FDI is defined as all FDI by Dutch resident banks supervised by the central 
bank and non-financial FDI as total FDI net of banking FDI, excluding also insurance 
companies and pension funds, other financial institutions including financial holding 
companies, bourses and brokers. Non-financial FDI covers 190 host countries for the years 
1984 to 2002 for the whole population of affiliates of multinationals; and 71 countries receive 
positive banking FDI between 1984 and 2002.
7 Five of these firms were among the 100 
largest non-financial multinationals in the world in 2002 by foreign assets.
8 In 2007 Dutch 
FDI represented 5.5% of world FDI while US FDI represented 18% (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Following the conventional definition of FDI, outward stocks are classified according to the 
activity of the non-resident enterprise and consist of investments in which the parent has at 
least a 10% ownership share.  
                                                 
6 http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/popup.cgi?/usr/statistics/excel/t12.6.2ey.xls 
7 Unfortunately, since the method of reporting changed in 2003 the 2003-2009 data is not used. 
Before this date, all data was reported through the banking system, since they collect balance sheet 
data for loan purposes and perform the actual transactions. After April 2003, a new system was 
introduced based on direct reporting by resident parent companies for a slightly smaller sample 
covering at least 95% of investments. 
8 These are (rank; industry): Shell (6; petroleum), Unilever (36; food product), Philips (37; electrical 
& electronic equipment), Ahold (51; retail), Reed Elsevier (90; publishing and printing). (UNCTAD, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2443&lang=1)   11 
The top five of largest destination countries for banking FDI in 2002 are Belgium, the US, 
Ireland, the UK, and Brazil. In 1984 these were Switzerland, the US, West Germany, 
Netherlands Antilles and the UK. Top non-financial FDI destination countries in 2002 
include the US, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. China ranks a mere 27th 
among all countries in terms of non-financial FDI. Figures 1 and 2 shows the size and 
international scope of non-financial and banking FDI. FDI has grown rapidly in terms of 
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Figure 2: Banking outward FDI (in constant 2000 USD bn) 
   12 
Table 1 offers some stylized facts on outward FDI. Banking FDI has increased almost nine-
fold in the course of 19 years, while non-financial FDI quadrupled (and real GDP less than 
doubled). The fastest (above average) growing regions for banking are Eastern Europe, South 
Asia, East Asia and North America. For non-financial FDI these are also Eastern Europe and 
South Asia, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Western Europe. Western Europe 
and North America remain however by far the most important destination regions by overall 
volume.  
Table 1: Regional spread of non-financial and banking FDI (mln 2000 USD) 
Region  Total banking FDI  Total non-financial FDI 
  1984  2002  1984  2002 
East Asia & Pacific (incl. China)  202  2,341  2,450  18,773 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  8  869  159  9,807 
Latin America & Caribbean  270  2,384  5,124  13,924 
Middle East & North Africa  166  301  1,251  3,355 
North America  439  4,111  27,308  53,084 
South Asia (incl. India)  6  231  79  846 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3  42  551  4,405 
Western Europe  1,230  10,151  18,664  130,213 
         
Total  2,325  20,430  55,586  234,407 
 
To measure the extent of home banking in host countries there exist more variables than 
direct investment alone. The supervisory authority also collects actual local lending.
9 This 
allows distinguishing between (i) direct investment, (ii) total assets (loans) owned by 
branches, and (iii) local foreign currency lending by consolidated home country resident 
banks (which includes cross-border lending).
10 For local lending in local currency (iv) the 
data is collected for reporting to the BIS. Unfortunately, because reporting was not required 
for local currency lending in the 40 BIS-reporting countries, the data only includes local 
currency lending in mostly developing countries. Foreign currency lending is the sum of 
lending to banks, the public sector and the private sector, but such a breakdown is not 
available for local currency lending.  
Furthermore, the empirical model requires a measure of the extent of third country foreign 
banking. Micco et al. (2007) collected annual data between 1995 and 2005 on the volume of 
                                                 
9 In the Netherlands this is the central bank, which collects locational banking statistics following the 
guidelines of the Bank for International Settlements (2008). 
10 Branches plus subsidiaries and joint ventures, where inter-office positions are netted out. The BIS 
distinguishes between branches, which are defined as unincorporated entities wholly owned by a 
parent bank, while subsidiaries are separate incorporated entities at least 50% owned by a parent bank. 
Joint ventures are incorporated entities in which the parent bank holds a major stake.    13 
banking assets and the share which is held by foreign banks (including Dutch banks) for a 
large number of developed and developing countries. Their main data source is Bankscope 
augmented with individual annual reports to track ownership over time. The data covers at 
least 75% of total banking assets in each destination country. 
To construct the share of third country foreign banking in destination countries the sum of 
Dutch consolidated parent lending and FDI, which is the sum of (i), (iii), and (iv), is 
subtracted from the total of foreign assets from Micco et al. (2007).
11 Because there is 
missing data for local currency lending the estimation strategy will experiment with 
excluding it altogether and selecting on a restricted group of countries for which all data is 
available. 
The other important control variables come from a variety of (standard) sources as specified 
in detail in Appendix A. The next Section explores the time series properties of FDI and each 
of these control variables, which determines the appropriate specification.  
 
5.  Short-run, long-run and spatial determinants of FDI  
The strong upwards trend of aggregate outward FDI reported in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that 
FDI is non-stationary, and it may be not enough to allow for a common deterministic trend or 
year effects. Recent studies that do not explicitly take account of these issues assume that 
investment in a specific host country is independent from investments done earlier in the 
same host country, but this seems overly restrictive. For example, Baltagi et al. (2007) 
estimate the (spatial) determinants of US outward FDI stocks and affiliate sales between 1989 
and 1999 using as much industry level data as is publicly available. Although they carefully 
allow for third-country effects and industry-time dummies to capture industry-time specific 
effects common to host countries, they do not test for stationarity of FDI or other regressors. 
If direct investment to specific host countries is trending, the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors on the pooled data are unreliable. Similarly, Blonigen et al. (2007) use the 
same data source on affiliate sales data over 16 years: except for a common deterministic 
trend, they do not investigate the time-series properties of the data. The instability created by 
potentially trending variables could affect the estimates as well. Carr et al. (2001) and 
                                                 
11 Unfortunately, they cannot share the individual bank data which could reveal the share of Dutch 
banks in total assets in their data. Foreign banks are defined on the basis of at least 50% foreign 
ownership.   14 
Markusen and Maskus (2002) do not allow for cross-sectional dependence and treat each host 
country as an independent destination, and are thus susceptible to a similar critique.   
With this in mind, Table 2, column (a), presents the preliminary regression result of equation 
1. The result is that banking FDI has a significant effect on the subsequent level of non-
financial FDI. Moreover, general financial development does not benefit FDI. Trade 
liberalization, market potential, free trade agreements and small government (which proxies 
for low taxes) all attract FDI. The market potential of neighbouring countries discounted by 
distance has no effect, nor does the distance-discounted level of FDI in the region. However, 
these estimates may be biased because of non-stationarity, which will be addressed first. 
Apart from outward FDI, the variables human capital, GDP and the size of the population 
may also be non-stationary. This need not be a problem if vit is stationary, because equation 
(2) then forms a co-integrated relationship from which the long-run effects on FDI can be 
deduced. A unit root test can verify whether this is the case, but it must explicitly allow for 
the  possibility  that  the  data  exhibits  cross-sectional  dependence  from  spatial  effects  as 
predicted by theory. Such cross-sectional dependence renders standard IPS tests for a unit 
root (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) invalid, but CIPS unit root tests take into account general 
cross- sectional dependence by augmenting ADF regressions for each country with cross-
section averages (Pesaran, 2007). Moreover, the standardized version of the cross-sectionally 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) allows for unbalanced panels.
12 
13 Table 3 presents the 
results  of  the  CADF(p)  test  for  orders  p=0  and  p=1  and  for  two  types  of  deterministic 
components. In almost all cases the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected. For population 
and financial development the null can also not be rejected if the sample is restricted to a 
balanced panel. Table 3 also reports IPS and LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) tests which do 
not allow for cross-sectional dependence. The LLC test has more power, but also requires 
balanced data and assumes a homogenous auto-regressive parameter (Banerjee and Wagner, 
2009). Again, the null is almost never rejected. Table 4 performs the same tests on the first 
difference of every variable to test for a possible mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables. The null 
                                                 
12 Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte (2007) show that, if spatial dependence is present in the data, the 
Pesaran (2007) test performs much better than first generation panel unit root test which do not take 
cross-sectional dependence into account. 
13 Since this test cannot accommodate gaps in the data and requires at least six time periods, the 
Ukraine (for which less than six observations exist) is dropped and gaps are removed. There are 15 
gaps in the data, so observation of Brazil before 1988 are deleted, also Greece before 1997, India 
before 1992, Indonesia after 1998, Morocco before 1996, New Zealand before 1997 and after 2000, 
Panama before 1996 and after 2000, Paraguay before 1990, Portugal after 2000, Russia after 1998, Sri 
Lanka before 1988, and Thailand after 1998 is deleted, affecting 31 observations in total.    15 
is nearly always comfortably rejected, also if the CADF(1) test is restricted to a balanced 
panel of observations. Overall, all variables can thus be regarded as I(1). 
 
Table 2: Long-run determinants of FDI 
Dependent variable: ln non-financial FDI  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
ln home banking FDI (t-1)  0.068***  0.083**  0.085**  0.260*** 
  (0.025)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.042) 
Fin. development (private credit/GDP)  -0.003  -0.004**  -0.003*  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
ln population  -0.482  -0.263  -0.799  0.755*** 
  (0.878)  (1.246)  (1.067)  (0.056) 
Trade liberalization  0.288**  0.555***  0.548***  1.062*** 
  (0.127)  (0.202)  (0.207)  (0.318) 
ln human capital  -0.204  -0.660    0.522 
  (0.415)  (0.476)    (0.376) 
ln distance (km)        -0.524** 
        (0.251) 
ln GDP per capita (t-1)  1.046***  2.143***  2.085***  1.330*** 
  (0.226)  (0.412)  (0.411)  (0.136) 
ln GDP surrounding market potential  0.375  0.755  0.900  0.192 
  (1.058)  (1.331)  (1.266)  (0.508) 
FTA  0.296**  0.155  0.072  0.507* 
  (0.126)  (0.209)  (0.204)  (0.289) 
Real exchange rate  -0.095  -1.961*** -1.858***  -2.388*** 
  (0.466)  (0.712)  (0.720)  (0.499) 
Implicit tax rate (Government % GDP*100)  -0.057***  0.004    -0.012 
  (0.018)  (0.027)    (0.018) 
Institutions 5-yearly  0.008  0.001    0.029 
  (0.013)  (0.011)    (0.020) 
spatial lag: ln non-financial FDI (i-1)  -0.319  -0.403  -0.391  -0.227 
  (0.197)  (0.262)  (0.244)  (0.304) 
         
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  no 
DOLS, 1 lead 1 lag  no  yes  yes  yes 
Robust LM test for spatial lag  1.536  5.673**  5.180**  1.108 
Robust LM test for spatial error  0.630  0.619  0.408  0.231 
Observations  632  494  494  494 
Log-likelihood  -324.8  -176.6  -178.4  -463.1 
Variance ratio  0.962  0.972  0.972  0.911 
Number of countries  46  46  46  46 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Robust LM statistics test for the 
presence of a spatial lag in the dependent variable or in the error. H0: spatial lag/error=0. 
Constant, and year fixed effects included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests on level variables 
  CADFi  IPS  LLC  CADFi  IPS 
cross-sectional 
dependence:  yes  no  no  yes  no 
lag order:  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1 
  Intercept  Intercept + trend 
ln non-financial FDI  -3.3
a  2.9  0.3 1.7 10.5 7.1 2.0 9.3 -0.7 -4.4
a
ln home banking FDI (t-1)  -1.1  2.9  -1.8
b -1.7
b 6.6 5.1 2.4 7.1 0.6 -6.7
a
financial development  -3.2
a  2.1  3.0 1.9 4.8 2.2 -0.7 4.5 -2.7
a -1.1
ln population  -8.2
a  1.5 -59.6
a -9.0
a 14.9 0.7 8.7 8.1 17.8 1.8
ln human capital  -1.2  4.2  4.0 -0.7 4.1 4.5 -1.5 8.9 -3.6
a -3.1
a
ln GDP per capita (t-1)  2.0  5.8  4.1 2.9 15.6 5.3 2.6 5.7 1.5 -12.0
a
ln GDP surrounding 
market potential  1.3  2.7  3.5 3.2 17.1 6.2 -1.0 6.1 -0.2 -0.4
Real exchange rate based 
on GDP price level  0.3  2.6  -3.6
a -0.9 -2.5
a -1.1 1.5 4.6 -2.6
a -5.5
a
Implicit tax rate 
(Government share of 
GDP*100) 
3.0  5.4  0.5 -1.5 0.4 0.4 1.6 5.7 0.0 -1.0
Institutions  1.0  1.2  2.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 5.5 2.6 1.5
ln home banking FDI (i-1)  -3.1
b  6.3  5.0 6.8 13.4 8.6 3.3 8.4 -1.6
c -10.5
a
Note:  CIPSi  H0:  All  series  are  non-stationary.  N=46;  T≈13.74.  The  statistics  are  the 
standardized version of the CIPS(p) statistic for an unbalanced panel. The CIPS(p) statistic is 
the  cross-section  average  of  the  cross-sectionally  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test  statistic 
(CADFi(p))). Following Pesaran (2007), extreme t-values are truncated to avoid any undue 
influence of extreme outcomes, because t is small (10-20). IPS H0: All panels contain unit 
roots. The IPS(p) test allows for heterogeneous auto-regressive parameters of order p but not 
for cross-sectional dependence. For the IPS test with a trend at least 7 periods are needed so 
Greece is deleted. LLC H0: Panels contain unit roots. The LLC(p) test requires a balanced 
panel (N=20; T=18) and assumes a common auto-regressive parameters of order p and no 
panel specific means or time trends (for the latter N should be small relative to T). Statistic is 
adjusted for a lagged dependent variable. a: p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: p<0.1.  
 
Table 5 tests the null of no co-integration between non-financial FDI, banking FDI and 
control variables, using the residuals from regression (1) of Table 2. Because there is no 
evidence for cross-sectional dependence in de dependent variable, nor in the residuals, 
according to the robust LM tests
14, the test for co-integration is based on the standard IPS and 
LLC test procedures which allows for heterogeneous and homogenous autoregressive 
parameters respectively. The Fisher ADF or Fisher Phillips–Perron tests combine the test 
statistics of country-by-country unit root tests and provide an additional check. The null of no 
co-integration is rejected in all cases. Hence, regression (1) of Table 2 can be treated as co-  
                                                 
14 The tests are based on a whether the general regression  y Xb e = +  can be significantly improved by 
including either of the terms  Wy r or  W l e , robustified against the alternative of the other form. See 
also Appendix A.   17 
Table 4: Panel unit root tests on first differences 
  CADFi(0) CADFi(1)  IPS(0)  IPS(1)  LLC(0)  LLC(1) 
 ln non-financial FDI  -8.2





 ln home banking FDI (t-1)  -7.7





 financial development  -8.3














 ln GDP per capita (t-1)  -6.6





 ln GDP surrounding 
market potential  -7.7





 Real exchange rate based 
on GDP price level  -3.9





 Implicit tax rate 
(Government share of 
GDP*100) 
-6.8










 ln home banking FDI (i-1)  -7.2





Note: CIPSi H0: All series are non-stationary. N=46; T≈12.74. The statistics are the 
standardized version of the CIPS(p) statistic for an unbalanced panel. The CIPS(p) 
statistic is the cross-section average of the cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test statistic (CADFi(p))). Following Pesaran (2007), extreme t-values are truncated to 
avoid any undue influence of extreme outcomes, because t is small (10-20). IPS H0: 
All panels contain unit roots. The IPS(p) test allows for heterogeneous auto-regressive 
parameters of order p but not for cross-sectional dependence. For the IPS test with a 
trend at least 7 periods are needed so Greece is deleted. LLC H0: Panels contain unit 
roots.  The  LLC(p)  test  requires  a  balanced  panel  (N=20;  T=17)  and  assumes  a 
common auto-regressive parameters of order p and no panel specific means or time 
trends. Statistic is adjusted for a lagged dependent variable. : p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: 
p<0.1.  
 
integrated, representing a relationship that is stable over time and thus allowing the 
coefficients to be interpreted as the long-run determinants of FDI. 
The estimates may nonetheless be biased because the error term vit in equation (2) may be 
correlated with each of the disturbances of the I(1) processes belonging to each independent 
variable. One can correct for this correlation by including leads and lags of the first difference 
of the I(1) independent variables in the regression - dynamic OLS or D-OLS (Kao and 
Chiang, 2000). Simulations in Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) suggest that D-OLS 
outperforms fully modified OLS (Phillips and Moon, 1999) and is least sensitive to I(2) 
components, cross-sectional correlation and small T (i.e. T ≤ 25). 
Column (b) in Table 2 adds first-differenced leads and lags of the independent variables to 
equation (2). This results in a slightly larger effect of banking FDI and the estimated effect of 
some control variables changes precision. In column (c) several insignificant variables are 
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Table 5: Co-integration test on residuals of equation (1) 
IPS  ADF(0) N=46; T≈13.74  ADF(1) N=46; T≈13.74 
  -2.90***  -1.81** 
LLC  ADF(0) N=20; T=18  ADF(1) N=20; T=18 
  -8.30***  -8.62*** 
Fisher  ADF(1) N=46; T≈13.74 
 
ADF(0) & PP(0) 
N=46; T≈13.74  -2.05** 




Note: IPS: H0: All panels contain unit roots. Allows for panel specific auto-
regressive parameter and includes panel means. LLC: H0: Panels contain unit 
roots. Assumes homogenous auto-regressive parameter.  Fisher: H0: All 
panels contain unit roots. Allows for panel specific auto-regressive parameter 
and includes panel means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
dropped which increases the sample somewhat, resulting in a slightly larger effect. In none of 
these regressions the null of no spatial auto-correlation can be rejected. Even when the 
unobserved country effects are dropped to exploit the cross-sectional variation in the data 
there is no evidence for a significant spatial lag, but a much larger effect of banking FDI. 
Furthermore, the usual determinants of non-financial FDI are confirmed. Local market 
potential, trade liberalization, and free trade agreements attract FDI whilst distance deters it. 
Together with the insignificant spatial lag this suggests that non-financial FDI, which is itself 
an aggregate of many different sectors, is on average horizontal in nature in favour of the 
Markusen (1984) model, where firms seek out the best market and make little use of regional 
markets or suppliers in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the analysis finds statistically 
significant support for the hypothesis that, given informational imperfections in globally 
integrated capital markets, destination countries where the currency is weak in real terms 
attract more FDI due to more spending power of home firms and/or lower costs of non-
tradables costs in the destination country (cf., Froot and Stein, 1991). The effects of taxation 
as proxied by the size of government as a share of GDP and good institutions have no 
significant effect on FDI.
15  
Since equation (2) is a co-integrating relationship, Table 6 finally presents the estimates of 
both the short- and long-run dynamics of the panel error-correction model (equation 4).  
The error-correction coefficient ξ is significant at the 1% level which confirms convergence 
towards the steady state after transitory shocks (down to 10% of steady state in 4 years). 
Column (a) indicates that of the short-run dynamic effects only banking FDI and income per 
                                                 
15 Recent research as also found that the quality of institutions has more bearing on portfolio 
investment than on direct investment (Daude and Fratzscher, 2008).   19 
capita are statistically significant. For example, trade liberalization has no immediate effect 
on FDI although it raised the long run equilibrium volume of FDI. A one percent positive 
shock to income on the other hand boosts FDI by 0.5% the next year and, if permanent, raises 
the equilibrium volume of FDI by 1.6%. General financial development has no effect on non-
financial FDI, nor does the stock of FDI from the rest of the world as proxied by the 
cumulative inflow of FDI since 1980 and tested in (b).
16 Columns (c) and (d) furthermore 
control for the volume of lending in host markets, but unlike banks' direct investment, these 
are not robust to allowing for non-nested arbitrary correlation of the errors within both 
countries and years (Cameron et al., 2010) as shown by regession (e). This implies that it is 
less likely that firms need banks for local direct financing, and that it is soft knowledge rather 
than hard knowledge that benefits firms. None of the additional tests yield results for the 
short run dynamics. The preferred estimate in column (f) finds that a permanent one standard 
deviation increase in banking FDI (about 60%) increases the equilibrium level of non-


















                                                 
16 Here total Dutch FDI inflow is subtracted from total foreign inflow of FDI by country and year 
(World Bank, 2009) and cumulated annually, setting 1979 to zero. For Dutch data only, this method 
yields a correlation between actual stocks and the cumulative flow of 0.95. 
17 The results are robust to excluding Barbados, Hong-Kong, Panama and Singapore, which are 
defined as offshore centres by the Bank for International Settlements.  
18 The list of countries included is provided in Appendix Table B2.   20 
  Table 6: Panel error-correction estimates 
Dependent variable: ￿(1) ln non-
financial FDI         
2-way 
clustering   
Error correction:  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) 
ln non-financial FDI (t-1)  -0.423*** -0.455*** -0.552*** -0.426*** -0.426*** -0.418*** 
  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.100)  (0.066)  (0.087)  (0.067) 
ln home banking FDI (t-2)  0.070***  0.073***  0.084**  0.060***  0.060***  0.069*** 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.017) 
ln population (t-1)  -0.578  -0.429  -1.475  -0.622  -0.622  -0.583 
  (0.508)  (0.576)  (1.101)  (0.566)  (0.675)  (0.533) 
Trade liberalization (t-1)  0.303***  0.380***  0.158  0.318***  0.318**  0.321*** 
  (0.112)  (0.129)  (0.193)  (0.114)  (0.131)  (0.106) 
ln GDP per capita (t-2)  0.664***  0.631***  0.543*  0.596***  0.596***  0.651*** 
  (0.184)  (0.191)  (0.295)  (0.181)  (0.223)  (0.179) 
Real exchange rate (t-1)  -0.907**  -0.882*  0.186  -0.837*  -0.837*  -0.944** 
  (0.433)  (0.499)  (0.846)  (0.421)  (0.468)  (0.418) 
-0.001            Fin. development  
(private credit/GDP) (t-1)  (0.002)           
ln cumulative FDI inflow ROW (t-1)    0.080         
    (0.057)         
ln home lending, foreign currency (t-1)      0.174**  0.077**  0.077   
      (0.068)  (0.038)  (0.054)   
ln home lending, local currency (t-1)      0.010       
      (0.032)       
Short-run dynamics:             
∆(1) ln non-financial FDI (t-1)  -0.082  -0.072  -0.107*  -0.083  -0.083  -0.085 
  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.083)  (0.052) 
￿(1) ln home banking FDI (t-1)  0.062**  0.067**  0.102**  0.059**  0.059*  0.062** 
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.049)  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.027) 
∆(1) ln population  -1.372  1.185  -9.034  -1.088  -1.088  -0.305 
  (4.868)  (5.667)  (6.339)  (4.846)  (5.246)  (4.792) 
∆(1) Trade liberalization  0.188  0.227  0.089  0.201  0.201  0.193 
  (0.198)  (0.204)  (0.250)  (0.198)  (0.283)  (0.197) 
∆(1) ln GDP per capita (t-1)  0.504***  0.497**  0.235  0.462***  0.462  0.505*** 
  (0.179)  (0.187)  (0.299)  (0.172)  (0.321)  (0.174) 
∆(1) Real exchange rate  0.599  0.555  1.297**  0.585  0.585  0.536 
  (0.424)  (0.463)  (0.506)  (0.409)  (0.452)  (0.413) 
0.001            ∆(1) Fin. development  
(private credit/GDP)  (0.001)           
∆(1) ln cumulative FDI inflow ROW    -0.270         
    (0.206)         
    0.052  0.045  0.045    ∆(1) ln home lending,  
foreign currency (t-1)      (0.061)  (0.048)  (0.060)   
    0.024        ∆(1) ln home lending,  
local currency (t-1)      (0.027)       
             
Observations  639  626  341  649  649  649 
R-squared  0.261  0.282  0.371  0.264  0.315  0.259 
Number of countries  55  54  38  55  55  55 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses in (a)-(d) and (f) and clustered by year and country 
in (e). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ROW: rest of the world. Constant, year and country fixed effects 
included.   21 
6.  Correcting for banking FDI endogeneity 
The fact that banks specialize in screening and monitoring their clients suggests that they 
have insider information on multinationals' plans for international expansion. The positive 
correlation between banking FDI and non-financial FDI could also reflect banks following 
their clients. A time lag of one year may not be enough to circumvent that possibility, nor 
does it adequately deal with the second possibility, that both banks and multinationals expand 
into foreign markets to sell products locally and simply react to unobserved improvements in 
the investment climate or market potential. Banking FDI therefore has to be instrumented. 
This section shows that the main effect is robust across several instruments and samples.   
Banks investing in the US during the 80s were partly following their clients and partly 
responding to fewer entry restrictions (Goldberg and Grosse, 1994), while more recently 
banking FDI has responded strongly to liberalization of the banking sector such as in Latin 
America during the 90s, and after local crises required recapitalization of the banking sector 
which was partly done through allowing entry of foreign banks (Goldberg, 2009). This is also 
reflected in the data by the jump in destination countries after 1990 and 1995 (see Figure 2). 
Sometimes, foreign banks were already present before regulation became tighter and they 
could only expand again after later liberalization.
19 This suggests that changes in banking 
sector regulation should successfully predict entry and expansion of foreign banks. 
Variable Z in equation (3), the instrument that predicts banking FDI, but does not predict the 
outcome, is provided by a new database of financial reforms (Abiad et al., 2010). The 
banking sector was up until the 80s and 90s one of the most widely regulated sectors in 
industrial and developing countries, with common state ownership, entry restriction, and 
capital flow and interest rate regulations in place. The database tracks and grades actual 
policy changes in 91 countries between 1973 and 2005 in integer steps between zero and four 
on several dimensions, four being fully liberalized. These are: credit controls and reserve 
requirements, credit ceilings, interest rates, banking sector entry, capital account transactions, 
privatization of banks, security markets and banking sector supervision.  
Four measures of financial reform stand out for the purpose of predicting banking FDI and 
the services that banks offer to multinationals. Banking sector entry is an obvious candidate 
(with the weight of sub-components in brackets) which reaches a maximum with majority 
foreign ownership of domestic banks (2/5), free entry of new domestic banks (1/5), no 
                                                 
19 See for an example from Pakistan: Mian (2006).   22 
branching restrictions (1/5), allowing universal banks (1/5). Free capital account transactions 
regarding financial credits allow banks to offer their clients cross-border services essential to 
FDI. These are considered liberalized if the exchange rate system is unified (1/3), foreign 
borrowing by banks is unrestricted (1/3), banking capital outflow is free (1/3). Banking sector 
supervision levels the playing field between foreign and domestic banks and is composed of: 
the application of the Basel capital adequacy ratio (1/6), supervision independent from the 
ministry of finance and a legal framework in place (2/6), effective on- and off-site bank 
examinations (2/6), supervision covering all banks (1/6). The liberalization of security 
markets allows banks to offer a wider range of financial products. It can reach three-fifth of 
its maximum value if a country has a liberalized market for treasury bills, corporate bond, 
equity, and derivatives markets, including deregulated institutional investors. A further two-
fifths of the score can be achieved by allowing majority foreign ownership. Although the 
latter component of the security markets variable has a smaller weight it will also affect the 
outcome variable and is therefore not suitable as an instrument. Unfortunately, they do not 
publish the sub-components separately. However, Abiad et al. (2010) note that in mainly low 
income countries information of foreign ownership restrictions was not available and values 
were imputed based on the level of the first components' development. The analysis will 
experiment allowing the security markets variable to affect the outcome as well.  
Although the banking sector remains heavily regulated, such reforms may have resulted from 
World Bank or IMF led wider economy reforms which may simultaneously make a country 
more attractive to other FDI as well. The reforms in this database are specific to the banking 
sector, but to control for the extend that other reforms took place at the same time the 
regressions will always control for an institutional measure of trade liberalization from 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008) and improvements in the rule of law, corruption, government 
stability, quality of the bureaucracy and the investment profile from the International Country 
Risk Guide. In addition, the data show no correlation between reforms of banking sector 
entry or supervision and (lagged) changes in trade liberalization. Reform of capital account 
transactions and security markets correlate positively with trade liberalization, but also with 
lags. Moreover, Appendix C explores an alternative instrument from Golub (2009) on 
liberalization of service sectors for FDI, for a sample of OECD countries. 
The result is reported in Table 7a. Column (a) reports the result of estimating equation (2) 
where Z = (Banking sector entry, Capital account transactions regarding financial credits, 
Banking Supervision, Security Markets). Except for banking sector entry all the instruments   23 
Table 7a: Instrumenting banking FDI with banking sector regulatory reform 















 (1) ln non-
financial 
FDI 
 (1) ln manu-
facturing FDI 
ln non-financial FDI (t-1)      -0.420***  -0.468*** 
      (0.073)  (0.076) 
ln home banking FDI (t-1) (instrumented)    0.304**  0.155***  0.159** 
    (0.122)  (0.054)  (0.062) 
ln total population (t-1)  3.101  -1.648  -0.743  -0.670 
  (1.981)  (1.128)  (0.505)  (0.674) 
Trade liberalization (t-1)  -0.767  0.422*  0.353**  0.358** 
  (0.463)  (0.213)  (0.134)  (0.176) 
ln GDP per capita (t-2)  -0.067  0.753***  0.593***  0.773*** 
  (0.554)  (0.269)  (0.198)  (0.273) 
Real exchange rate (t-1)  -0.052  -0.286  -0.916**  -0.831 
  (0.796)  (0.538)  (0.444)  (0.547) 
Institutions, 5 year initial (t-1)  -0.002  0.010  0.001  0.001 
  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Banking sector entry (t-1)  -0.183*       
  (0.104)       
0.194*        Capital account transactions regarding 
financial credits (t-1)  (0.109)       
Banking Supervision (t-1)  0.236**       
  (0.112)       
Security Markets (t-1)  0.600***       
  (0.186)       
Short-run dynamics:         
 (1) ln non-financial FDI (t-1)      -0.081*  -0.054 
      (0.044)  (0.037) 
∆(1) ln home banking FDI (t-1) (instr.)      0.081  0.057 
      (0.069)  (0.066) 
 (1) ln total population      -1.207  3.120 
      (4.961)  (5.890) 
 (1) Trade liberalization      0.141  0.270 
      (0.209)  (0.319) 
 (1) ln GDP per capita (t-1)      0.460**  0.399 
      (0.176)  (0.274) 
 (1) Real exchange rate      0.497  0.849 
      (0.417)  (0.572) 
 (1) Institutions, 5 year initial      -0.006  -0.011 
      (0.010)  (0.014) 
Observations (countries)  732 (52)  678 (52)  610 (50)  600 (50) 
R-squared  0.570  0.704  0.267  0.323 
Cragg-Donald F-stat  19.44       
Robust test of overidentifying restrictions (p-
value)    0.775  0.782  0.801 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust LM test for 
spatial lag/error in 1st stage regression (3): 1.344/1.396. Year and country effects and constant term 
included in all models. Excluded instruments in italics. 
   24 
Table 7b: Co-integration test on residuals of equation (2), column (b), Table 8a 
IPS  ADF(0) N=46; T≈14.78  ADF(1) N=46; T≈15.35 
  -0.908  1.360 
LLC  ADF(0) N=24; T=19  ADF(1) N=24; T=19 
  -7.077***  -6.114*** 
Fisher  ADF(1) N=46; T≈14.08 
 
ADF(0) & PP(0)  
N=46; T≈14.08  108.6 
Fisher  PP(1) N=46; T≈14.08 
 
 
124.5**  125.4** 
Note:  IPS  H0:  All  panels  contain  unit  roots.  Allows  for  panel  specific  auto-regressive 
parameter  and  includes  panel  means.  LLC  H0:  Panels  contain  unit  roots.  Assumes 
homogenous auto-regressive parameter.  Fisher H0: All panels contain unit roots. Allows for 
panel specific auto-regressive parameter and includes panel means. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
have the expected sign and a level playing field in the form of high quality supervision and 
developed security markets are most significant. While free entry of banks allows also 
foreign banks to invest, it also increases competition in the banking sector, which may cause 
banks to invest less on average. The Cragg-Donald F-statistic (which is much higher than the 
rule of thumb 10) suggests that the instruments are strong: the IV estimate has less than 5% 
bias relative to the un-instrumented case. The second stage reports both the cointegrating 
relationship in column (b) and the error-correction representation of equation (3) in column 
(c). In both cases the statistically significant effect of banking FDI on non-financial FDI in 
the long run is confirmed and the robust overidentifying restrictions test cannot reject that 
there is no correlation between the instruments and the second stage error. The estimate is 
higher and corresponds to at least a 20% increase in the volume of FDI after a  
permanent one standard deviation increase in banking FDI.
20 The results also confirm that 
regulation is a better predictor of banking globalization than foreign market potential. Lastly, 
to address concern that the quality of institutions and trade liberalization insufficiently 
capture further liberalization of the economy that may be correlated with banking sector 
reform, for example if trade liberalization only captures manufacturing trade liberalization 
but not services liberalization, column (d) presents a regression where the dependent variable 
is manufacturing sector FDI only. The result is very similar, lending further support to the 
identification strategy. Table 7b tests the residuals of equation (2), column (b) for non-
                                                 
20 That the effect is larger than the OLS estimate, even though one would expect a positive correlation 
between banking FDI and unobserved components affecting non-financial FDI, could be due to 
underlying heterogeneity to the benefits of banking FDI. The 'return' to banking FDI may be higher in 
those countries where the banking sector is more liberalized. This is a common observation in the 
returns to schooling literature, see Card (2001).   25 
stationarity and rejects in most cases that the errors are non-stationary, meaning that the 
trending variables follow a common trend, allowing estimation of the error-correction 
representation.  
Given  worries  that  security  market  liberalization  or  capital  account  transactions  reform 
affects the outcome variable (unreported) alternative regressions allow these to affect non-
financial FDI directly. In that case the F-statistic (for the remaining instruments) drops to 
7.99, but it affects the result qualitatively nor quantitatively, nor does it enter significantly in 
the second stage. Also, Appendix C shows that the effect is robust to instrumenting banking 
FDI with an  alternative measure of banking sector liberalization to foreign investors  and 
controlling for services liberalization directly, but for a smaller sample of OECD countries. 
 
7.  Do multinationals use home banks or any foreign banks? 
So far the analysis shows a strong positive effect of banking FDI and non-financial FDI of the 
same origin country. Multinationals need not rely on home banks for their investments 
abroad. Other foreign banks, which are foreign both from the perspective of the host country 
and the home country of the multinational can also provide cross-border financial services 
and provide local host market knowledge. For example, a firm may use banks which provide 
the best match in country coverage with respect to the firm's operations, which is not 
necessarily the home bank. However, the always included year fixed effects also control for 
the latter possibility. To test whether other banks can offer the same level of familiarity to 
home institutions, proprietary information, and the way of doing business by the 
multinational as a home bank would, the presence of third country foreign bank in host 
countries has to be to controlled for. Detailed bilateral information on the level of FDI by 
banks by host and origin country is unfortunately publicly unavailable, but Micco et al. 
(2007) offer a proxy in the form of the volume of banking assets and the share which is held 
by foreign banks annually between 1995 and 2005, covering the more recent period.  
Column (a) of Table 8 includes the log of the volume of total foreign assets.
21 The result is a 
strong significant positive effect of foreign banking in general on the long run level of non-
financial FDI. Column (b) splits total foreign assets (A) into third country banking assets 
(=A-B-C-D) and home banking assets (=B+C+D), where the latter is split into direct 
                                                 
21 The focus is on the long run relationship only, because the time dimension is short when foreign 
banking assets are included in the regression (T=7).   26 
investment (B), foreign currency lending (C) and local currency lending (D). As explained 
before, there is missing data for local currency lending and the smaller sample captures 
mostly developing countries. The result is that only home market foreign banking is 
statistically significant. Disregarding local currency lending and estimating a larger sample in 
column (c) reveals that third country banking does affect non-financial FDI positively, 
although home market banking is more significant.  
Given that the volume of lending yields less precise results than direct investment, columns 
(d)  to  (f)  focus  on  the  latter  and  instrument  both  banking  FDI  and  third-country  foreign 
banking assets. The latter is instrumented with only capital account transactions regarding 
financial  credits,  which  is  always  highly  significant  and  yields  high  F-test  scores.
22  The 
regression in column (d) implicitly assumes that the volume of assets held is proportional to 
the balance sheet value of FDI owned by banks. Under that assumption, the variable  
Table 8: Robustness to other foreign banking  
Dependent variable:  
ln non-financial FDI         
instrumenting both  
 ln home banking FDI and 
third-country banking assets 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f) 
0.161**      -0.082      A: ln foreign owned banking 
assets (incl. home) (t-1)  (0.068)      (0.179)     
  0.104      -0.062    ln 3rd-country foreign banking  
(=A - B - C - D) (t-1)    (0.109)      (0.279)   
    0.131*      0.020  ln 3rd-country foreign banking  
(=A - B - C) (t-1)      (0.076)      (0.250) 
B: ln home banking FDI (t-1)    0.154***  0.106***  0.473**  0.446*  0.398* 
    (0.047)  (0.032)  (0.219)  (0.263)  (0.237) 
  0.205  0.083        C: ln home lending, foreign 
currency (t-1)    (0.161)  (0.100)       
  -0.015          D: ln home lending, local 
currency (t-1)    (0.063)         
-0.103  0.128  -0.019  0.052  0.124  0.129  ln host banking assets (t-1) 
(0.090)  (0.106)  (0.158)  (0.073)  (0.093)  (0.097) 
C-D F-test home banking FDI        19.44  19.44  19.44 
C-D F-test 3rd-country assets        24.69  16.94  13.97 
Observations  607  186  308  321  280  287 
R-squared  0.293  0.275  0.286  0.257  0.215  0.249 
Number of countries  101  38  53  52  50  50 
Year and country effects always included. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
Constant included but not shown. Other included controls: ln population, trade liberalization, ln 
GDP per capita (t-1), real exchange rate, institutions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. First stage 
for ln home banking FDI as in Table 7(a). First stages for ln third-country banking assets use only 
capital account transactions regarding financial credits as IV, which is always highly significant. 
                                                 
22 That only this instrument is significant for third-country banking assets reflects the fact that these 
assets include not only FDI but also the volume of lending.   27 
measuring foreign owned banking assets captures only the variation in third-country foreign 
owned assets. After instrumentation, none of the third-country banking assets predict higher 
long-run  levels  FDI:  only  home  country  banking  FDI  still  boosts  non-financial  direct 
investment. The fact that home banking FDI is more important than hard information-based 
cross-border lending also points to the direction of the benefit of local soft information. The 
conclusion is that home bank branches and subsidiaries provide better services than other 
banks. 
 
8.  Information advantage of banks in countries with investor risk 
If the channel through which banks level the path for multinationals is by employing their 
information advantage on the pool of host country firms or by bridging institutional distance, 
then the effect of banking FDI should be greater in countries where doing business is more 
opaque. To test this, the regressions include (interactions with) measures of the degree of risk 
faced by investors as measured by the International Country Risk Guide for the following 
categories: corruption; bureaucracy quality; law and order; risk of contract 
viability/expropriation, profit repatriation, payment delays; and government unity, legislative 
strength, and popular support. Although it is unlikely that banks can speed up bureaucracy 
itself or prevent official expropriation, they may offer an information advantage. In countries 
where corruption, and weak law enforcement is a big problem, foreign firms face a higher 
probability of choosing the wrong business partners and making bad investment decisions. In 
such countries, the effective degree of control a foreign firm has over the average subsidiary 
may be low, increasing the case for extensive search for the best partners before a deal is 
made. More monitoring may also be required after the acquisition is made.  
Equation (2) is extended with an interaction between each measure of risk and (instrumented) 
banking FDI, both lagged by one period, while controlling for the sum of the score on all 
other  institutions,  the  volume  of  third  country  banking  assets,  and  the  volume  of  host 
domestic banking assets. The result is summarized in Table 9. The interactions are negative 
for almost all measures of risk, but only the interactions of home country banking FDI with 
less risk of corruption and better rule of law are significant at 95% confidence or more. The 
slopes are negative, indicating that the marginal effect of banking FDI on non-financial FDI 
increases in the risk of corruption and weakness of law enforcement. The marginal effect is 
significant for countries with corruption scores worse than 6, which is for all of the    28 
 Table 9: Interactions of measures of risk with banking FDI and third-country banking 
    Marg. effect is significant: 
Interaction of risk measure 














  slope  slope  from  until    min  max 
Institutions, sum of below (40)  0.003  -0.001           
less corruption (6)  -0.069**  -0.001  1  6  100%  0.36  0.71 
more law and order (6)  -0.097***  0.003  1.58  6  100%  0.28  0.71 
higher bureaucracy quality (4)  -0.054  -0.004           
less risk of contract 
viability/expropriation, profit 
repatriation, payment delays (12) 
0.018*  -0.002           
more government unity, legislative 
strength, popular support (12)  0.006  -0.000           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample years: 1996-2002. ln third-country foreign banking assets are 
total foreign banking assets minus home banking direct investment and minus home foreign currency 
lending. Also subtracting home local currency lending does not change the results, except for the fifth 
interaction which is then no longer weakly significant. Control variables: population, trade 
liberalization, GDP per capita, real exchange rate, direct effects of interacted variables. The direct 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of ln banking FDI for levels of corruption (left) and rule of 
law (right) 
 
observations in the sample. The effect is also always significant for varying degrees of law 
and order. These ranges are illustrated by Figure 3. The marginal effect is up to 0.71 for both 
the most corrupt countries (left graph), and for countries with the worst law enforcement 
(right graph). Note that none of the interactions with the volume of third-country foreign   29 
owned  banking  assets  are  significant.
23  This  means  that  institutions  do  not  interact 
significantly with the variation in banking assets from third countries. Only home country 
banks provide an advantage in countries that are either corrupt or have weak rule of law. 
 
9.  Which sectors benefit more from home banking? 
The results so far suggest that the harder it is to invest in a particular country, the more firms 
will make use of their home bank's international network to facilitate investment. It may also 
be  that  international  investment  is  harder  for  some  sectors,  because  of  sector  specific 
characteristics. This Section explores which sectors benefit more from international banking 
and finds that these tend to be sectors which rely more on external financing. The regressions 
in Appendix E rank sectors according to how much investment increases as a function of 
banking FDI, showing that real estate and transportation and communication lead the sector 
ranking, and agriculture and fisheries benefits the least. However, the ranking is slightly 
altered  when  examining  the  extensive  margin:  the  machines,  electronics,  automotive  and 
chemicals, rubber, plastics are more likely to invest in a new country if a home bank is 
present.  Table  10  below  takes  the  coefficients  as  given  and  correlates  these  with  four 
different sector characteristics: dependence on external financing from Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)
24; investment inefficiency from Durnev et al. (2004) capturing how hard it is to make 
optimal capital investment decisions
25; rating agency disagreement of corporate bonds from 
Morgan (2002) capturing opacity of the sector
26; and the number of subsectors for which data 
is  available  on  the  investment  inefficiency  measure,  a  proxy  for  how  different  firms  are 
within each FDI sector. The table shows three regressions for each margin. Where financial 
dependence is included these include resource and manufacturing sectors, while each third 
regression can also include the services and construction sectors. The most robust result is  
                                                 
23 Here the measure is total foreign banking assets minus home direct investment and minus home 
foreign currency lending. The results are qualitatively unchanged if also local currency lending is 
subtracted. In addition, the results are unchanged if also third-country banking assets is instrumented 
with regulatory reform. 
24 The fraction of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from operations during the 1980s, 
for 35 sectors. 
25 =|mq-1|, where mq is Tobin's marginal q ratio. It estimates the deviation from the optimal level of 
the change in firm value due to unexpected changes in investment scaled by expected changes, for 
196 industries between 1993 and 1997. A small number implies greater (capital budgeting) 
investment efficiency. 
26 Measures the degree to which Moody's and S&P disagree on the rating of corporate bonds issued by 
firms between 1983 and 1993 in 9 sectors relative to banks. The coefficient estimates are taken from 
Table 3, regression (6). A higher number implies more disagreement.   30 
Table 10: Which sector characteristics predict benefits from home banking FDI? 
sector dummy * home banking FDI coefficients (from Table A4a, reg. (b))  Dependent variable: 
Intensive margin  Extensive margin  Heckman intensive margin 
0.073
b  0.022
a    0.126
a  0.164
a    0.100
a  0.094
a    Financial 
dependence  (0.027)  (0.008)    (0.023)  (0.030)    (0.031)  (0.017)   
  0.008
b  -0.005    0.014  -0.000    0.011c  -0.009  Investment 
inefficiency     (0.004)  (0.016)    (0.017)  (0.013)    (0.006)  (0.016) 
  0.016  -0.234
a    0.083  0.017    0.257
a  0.130
a  Rating agency 
disagreement on 
corporate bonds   
(0.018)  (0.043)    (0.108)  (0.061)    (0.029)  (0.042) 
  0.005
a  0.004
a    0.000  0.001    0.005
a  0.005
a  Number of 
subsectors    (0.000)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.000)  (0.001) 
Observations  35  99  196  35  99  196  35  99  196 
R-squared  0.230  0.859  0.305  0.266  0.203  0.016  0.320  0.664  0.435 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. a: p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: p<0.1. 
 
that sectors which benefit more from home banking are also more likely to be dependent on 
external financing. There is also some evidence that complex sectors as measured by the 
number of distinct identifiable sub-sectors benefit more. 
 
10.  Estimating the effect of the sale of a major international bank 
Figure 4 below plots the stock of outward FDI between 2003 and 2009. Clearly visible is the 
drop in banking FDI after 2007. The drop in banking FDI was followed by a modest decline 
in non-financial FDI a year later (but a large departure from trend). The decline in banking 
FDI was however not entirely due to the recent crisis which started in 2007. Just before the 
crisis erupted, on October 17th 2007, it was agreed that a major multinational bank, ABN 
AMRO Holding N.V. with in excess of 1,508 billion USD in assets on its balance sheet
27, 
was to be sold to a consortium of three foreign banks consisting of Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS) from the UK, Fortis from Belgium and Santander from Spain. Bases on the results 
above, this could lead to an 8% drop in FDI.  
All shares were acquired in early 2008 and delisted from the stock exchange on 25 April 
2008 (ABN AMRO, 2008). In principle this event could provide a quasi experiment to 
estimate the hypotheses by means of for example difference-in-difference estimation. 
However, the sale, split and integration of the business units takes time, as explained below. 
                                                 
27 In 2006 it had 3,868 offices and branches in 56 countries and territories. Of these, 449 were in 
North America, 2,154 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1,144 were in Europe, 8 were in the 
Middle East and Africa and 113 were in the Asia Pacific Region. It had a branch in Brazil since 1917 
(ABN AMRO, 2008).   31 
In December 2007, the buying consortium agreed on separating and transferring ABN 
AMRO businesses to the new owners. RBS would acquire North America, Asia, and Europe 
(excluding Antonveneta in Italy), global clients (except Latin American), Netherlands 
wholesale clients and wholesale clients in Latin America (excluding Brazil). Fortis acquired 
Netherlands private clients, private clients (excluding Latin American) and asset 
management. Santander received Latin America (excluding wholesale clients outside Brazil), 
Antonveneta
28 and private clients in Latin America. The plan was approved by the Dutch 
Central Bank on 10 March 2008, after which integration started (ABN AMRO, 2008).  
If rebranding is the final phase of integration then it may take a year or more for an acquired 
subsidiary to have adapted its corporate governance to its new parent. For example, in 
September 2009, RBS rebranded the Morgans sharedealing business in Australia as RBS 
Morgans. Rebranding of the ABN AMRO Australia unit to RBS Australia was done in March 
that year and only on 10 February 2010, RBS announced that branches of the businesses it 
owned in India and the United Arab Emirates would be rebranded under its name, the former 
soon to be sold on to HSBC. ABN AMRO was partly bought back by the Dutch government 
after the nationalization of Fortis which had severe problems during the recent crisis. 
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Figure 4: Outward banking and non-financial FDI from 2003 to 2009 
                                                 
28 On 8 November 2007 Santander announced it had reached an agreement with Banco Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena from Italy with respect to the sale of Antonveneta.   32 
foreign subsidiaries.
29  
Over time, as the former Dutch controlled subsidiaries change management and adopt 
corporate governance and business strategies from their new parents, it may be that other 
Dutch non-financial multinationals will find it harder to do business abroad. However, this 
will probably start to take effect a year or longer from the moment of sale, consistent with 
this paper's finding that long run effects are more robust than short run effects. Given the 
estimated effects and the decline in the stock of aggregate banking FDI totalling 21%, non-
financial multinationals will invest 2.2 to 8.4 percent less, everything else equal, although (at 
most) 2.8% could be made up for by the similar services offered by the new owners.
30 
However, this masks variation at the country level, where the mean rate of change was -12% 
from 2007 to 2008 with exit in five countries and a decline in FDI in 16 countries. A year 
later the decline was again 7% on average and negative for 21 countries. Furthermore, 
corruption and rule of law also determine how important home banking is for FDI.  
 
11.  Conclusion 
While conventional wisdom has it that banks follow customers abroad, this paper provides, to 
the best of my knowledge, the first evidence that the presence of foreign banks subsequently 
boosts foreign investment by non-financial firms, and in particular when from the same home 
country. On average, a one standard deviation year-on-year increase in the stock of home 
origin banking FDI (of about 60%) leads, if permanent, to 24% more non-financial foreign 
direct investment from the same country, in the long run. This paper does not however claim 
that this is the only catalyser of investment. There is positive FDI in 121 countries not 
serviced by banking FDI, and countries themselves, aware of the difficulty of dealing with 
various institutions, for example set up investment promotion agencies (Javorcik and 
Harding, forthcoming) and free trade zones. Companies may also hire workers familiar with 
foreign markets (Javorcik et al., 2011). Nonetheless, banking FDI makes investment easier 
and less risky. Home banks have a larger and more significant effect than third-country or 
host domestic banks and that this effect is stronger in more risky markets. In addition, local 
soft information as captured by banks' direct investment in branches and subsidiaries is more 
important than relatively hard information-based cross-border lending. Since acquiring 
                                                 
29 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ABN_AMRO. 
30 Based on the range of estimates from Table 8.    33 
information takes time, the effects tend to apply at relatively longer horizons. At the sector 
level, there is a positive correlation between the effect of home banking FDI on non-financial 
FDI and sectors' reliance on external financing (which are therefore also more likely to have 
bank relationships), and sectors' investment in more distinct sub-sectors. Combined, these 
results suggest that banks intermediate FDI through increasing the size and quality of the pool 
of potential subsidiaries and bridging institutional distance. Although it cannot be ruled out, 
the evidence is somewhat less strong for banks' ability to efficiently organize internal capital 
markets or provision of direct financing. To attract both established and future multinational 
companies, it seems to make sense for a well-known British bank to advertise as 'the world's 
local bank', but more so for its British clients. Future research linking bank and loan level 
data to firm level data in home and host countries may shed more light on the details of the 
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Appendix A: Data definitions and sources, countries included 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description  Source 
ln FDI  ln value of outward foreign direct investment 
from The Netherlands in current mln USD, by 
country, year and sector, see also text 
DNB (2010)  
ln foreign owned banking 
assets 
Banking assets owned by foreign banks in host 
country. 
Micco et al. (2007) 
ln host owned banking 
assets 
Total banking assets in host country minus 
foreign owned banking assets. 
idem 
ln home lending, foreign 
currency 
foreign currency lending by consolidated 
branches and subsidiaries owned by 
Netherlands resident banks, by host country-
year 
DNB (2010)  
ln home lending, local 
currency 
local currency lending by consolidated 
branches and subsidiaries owned by 
Netherlands resident banks, by host country-
year 
idem 
ln population  ln of total population  World Bank (2009) 
Trade liberalization  = 1 if liberalized, dummy  Wacziarg & Welch 
(2008) 
ln human capital  average years of schooling age 25+  Barro and Lee (2010)  
ln distance  Vincenty distance in km between country 
centroids 
CID data and 
Vincenty (1975) 
ln GDP per capita  ln GDP per capita in current USD  World Bank (2009) 
ln GDP surrounding market 
potential 
distance weighted ln GDP in current USD  authors' calculation 
FTA  =1 if a country has a free trade agreement with 
The Netherlands in year t 
Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) 
Institutions  Sum of the following institution indices: 
Government Stability, Investment Profile, 
Corruption, Law and Order, Bureaucracy 
Quality. See also text. 
International Country 
Risk Guide 
Real exchange rate  Real exchange rate with Netherlands based on 
GDP price level 
PWT6.2, from 
Heston et al. (2006) 
Implicit tax rate  Government share of GDP  World Bank (2009) 
Financial development  Private credit as a share of GDP  idem 
Baking sector entry  See text, Section 6.  Abiad et al. (2010) 
Capital account transactions 
regarding financial credits 
See text, Section 6.  idem 
Banking supervision  See text, Section 6.  idem 
Security markets  See text, Section 6.  idem 
Procedures + days to form a 
business 
dummy equal to 1 if the number of procedures 
plus the number of days it takes to form a 
business is above the sample median 
Djankov et al. (2002) 
ln mean distance to coast or 
river 
ln mean geographical distance to the nearest 




Financial dependence  The fraction of capital expenditures not 
financed with cash flow from operations during 
the 1980s. 
Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) 
   A-2 
Rating agency disagreement 
on corporate bonds 
Measures the degree to which Moody's and 
S&P disagree on the rating of corporate bonds 
issued by firms between 1983 and 1993 in 9 
sectors relative to banks. Coefficient estimates 
from Table 3, regression (6). A higher number 
implies more disagreement. 
Morgan (2002) 
Investment inefficiency  =|mq-1|, where mq is Tobin's marginal q ratio. 
It estimates the deviation from the optimal level 
of the change in firm value due to unexpected 
changes in investment scaled by expected 
changes, for 196 industries between 1993 and 
1997. A small number implies greater (capital 
budgeting) investment efficiency. 
Durnev et al. (2004) 
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Appendix B: Estimating spatial lags 
With N potential host countries and T years of observation, the term ln it FDI r W  is added to 
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The block-diagonal matrix W corresponds to the spatial lag weighting matrix with each block 
along the diagonal corresponding to a single year. The blocks along the matrix W depend on 
distances, so are identical for each year. The off-diagonal elements in each block contain the 
spatial inverse-distance weights between any two potential host countries, where the 
distances are the Vincenty differences in kilometers between country centroids and are 
normalized by the shortest distance between two host countries (the distance between 
Netherlands and Belgium, i.e., 115.4 km). As an alternative to a spatial AR(1) process 
suggested by theory there may be statistical reasons to include a spatial MA(1) error term 
instead, which would add the term  it v r W  to equation (1). The analysis follows Florax et al. 
(2003) and performs robust Likelihood Multiplier (LM) tests: if they both reject the null of no 
spatial correlation the specification implied by the test with the highest score is used. 
Estimation is based on maximum likelihood (Anselin, 1988) and involves calculation of the 
determinant of large matrices. For example, the matrix W reaches a dimension of 632×632 
within the present sample. Kelejian and Prucha (1999) warn that calculation of the 
eigenvalues of W may be hampered by lack of accuracy. Fortunately, all estimated 
eigenvalues of matrices W for different samples had zero imaginary parts allowing standard 
methods of estimation. The properties of the weighting matrix may also violate consistency 
of the maximum likelihood estimates: the row and column sums should not diverge faster to 
infinity than the sample size N. Since W is an inverse distance matrix, it satisfies this 
condition (Lee, 2004).   A-4 
Appendix C: An alternative measure of FDI entry restrictions as IV 
This section presents an alternative measure of FDI entry restrictions collected by Golub 
(2009), which further demonstrates the robustness of the main result. He collected 
information on de facto FDI entry restrictions for 23 OECD countries for the years 1981, 
1986, 1991, 1998 and 2005, ranked between zero and one, for the sectors business services, 
telecommunications, construction, distribution, electricity, banking, insurance, tourism and 
transport. Of these, banking FDI restrictions provides an alternative instrument for home 
banking FDI, although for a smaller sample. A control for simultaneous liberalization of 
other services sectors, in addition to the measure for trade liberalization, is constructed: 
Services liberalization equals total services liberalization minus finance liberalization using 
weights from Golub (2009). Because some years are missing, intermediate years are imputed 
with the last known value, resulting in initial services liberalization.  
The results is given in table C1 below. Banking liberalization has a positive effect on banking 
FDI entry with 96% confidence and is not weak judging from the F-test which is above 10. 
The second stage in levels shows an equally strong effect of banking FDI on non-financial 
FDI within OECD countries compared to the larger sample of Table 7a, while market size 
and trade liberalization no longer have significant effects. The long-run effect is robust to 
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Table C1: Instrumenting banking FDI with an alternative instrument, 
OECD countries only  













 (1) ln non-
financial FDI 
ln non-financial FDI (t-1)      -0.346*** 
      (0.061) 
ln home banking FDI (t-1) (instrumented)    0.350**  0.248** 
    (0.146)  (0.103) 
ln total population (t-1)  7.024  -1.853  -1.213 
  (4.236)  (1.904)  (1.542) 
Trade liberalization (t-1)  -1.143**  0.035  0.191 
  (0.473)  (0.212)  (0.173) 
ln GDP per capita (t-2)  1.559  0.443  0.214 
  (1.055)  (0.439)  (0.314) 
Real exchange rate (t-1)  -0.285  -0.470  -0.857** 
  (0.722)  (0.583)  (0.386) 
Institutions, 5 year initial (t-1)  -0.028  -0.004  -0.006 
  (0.042)  (0.026)  (0.009) 
0.541  1.156  -0.040  Services liberalization (initial,  
except finance) (t-1)  (1.579)  (1.668)  (0.777) 
Banking liberalization (t-1)  1.323*     
  (0.635)     
Short-run dynamics:       
 (1) ln non-financial FDI (t-1)      -0.018 
      (0.109) 
∆(1) ln home banking FDI (t-1) (instr.)      0.220 
      (0.150) 
 (1) ln total population      11.934** 
      (5.260) 
 (1) Trade liberalization      -0.091 
      (0.152) 
 (1) ln GDP per capita (t-1)      0.299 
      (0.245) 
 (1) Real exchange rate      -0.007 
      (0.421) 
 (1) Institutions, 5 year initial      -0.028 
      (0.020) 
    -0.708   (1) Services liberalization (initial,  
except finance) (t-1)      (0.709) 
Observations (countries)  325 (20)  308 (20)  284 (20) 
R-squared  0.614  0.795  0.303 
Cragg-Donald F-stat  11.33     
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Year and country effects and constant term included in all models. Excluded instrument 
in italics.   A-6 
Appendix D: Testing and correcting for incidental truncation and selection bias 
The estimation so far has ignored several other potential sources of bias: left censoring of 
FDI and incidental truncation over time. Correcting for these yields the results that the 
positive effect of banking FDI is more robust than that of trade liberalization, and that the 
short run effects are not robust. 
The distributions of both banking and non-financial FDI are heavily left skewed, contain 
zeros and (in principle) unbounded positive values. Taking logs yields in both cases a normal 
distribution but censors the distribution at zero. Simply running the estimation on the (log) 
positive values may miss-specify the conditional mean if censoring is non-random and if 
censoring occurs often. Firms have good reasons to invest in only particular countries, 
suggesting that they enter according to their productivity and prevailing market conditions. 
This creates selection bias similar to problems encountered in health and labor economics 
(Heckman, 1979). Similarly, gravity equations to estimate bilateral trade flows (e.g., 
Anderson and Wincoop, 2003) have been corrected for sample selection bias by allowing for 
extensive and intensive margins in international trade (Helpman et al., 2008). The new 
gravity approach can explain ‘zeroes’, i.e., that no firm may be productive enough to export 
from one country to another country, and asymmetric bilateral trade patterns. They find 
evidence that the decision to export is well determined by measures of the cost of entry in a 
foreign market, while entry costs do not affect the amount of trade. The advantage of this 
method is that the model for the decision to investment abroad and the amount of investment 
are determined separately. Alternative methods that have featured in the (trade) literature are 
simple OLS on the selected sample, which assumes that both models are independent, while a 
Tobit regression makes the strong assumption that both margins can be captured by the same 
model. A third model is the nonlinear Poisson model (used in the context of trade by Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006)), which allows inclusion of both zero and non-zero trade flows but 
also makes the assumption that one model applies to both margins.
31 The two-stage method is 
favoured here, because it does not make additional assumptions on the determinants of each 
model. 
Censoring in one of the regressors (banking FDI) could be endogenous to the function that 
determines non-financial FDI. This also requires instrumentation of banking FDI, even if the 
                                                 
31 The non-linear Poisson model tends to underestimate the number of zeros. A two-part zero-inflated 
model with a negative binomial density corrects this. However, just as with OLS on the selected 
sample, it also relies on the assumption that entry and the amount of trade are independent.     A-7 
log amount of banking FDI was actually exogenous in the main equation (Wooldridge, 2002). 
To complicate matters further, the panel of FDI after taking logs is unbalanced due to 
observations with zero FDI. The zeros occur mostly at the beginning of the sample, although 
they occasionally also occur in later periods, suggesting some exit from foreign markets as 
well. There may be unobserved time-invariant factors that both determine the amount of FDI 
and the decision to invest in each period, making entry and exit endogenous.
32 This requires 
modification of the Heckman model, which is provided by Wooldridge (1995).
33  
Here, the population of outward FDI is investigated at the sectoral level, where the problem 
of zeroes is potentially much less severe. Conditioning on positive banking FDI and other 
main control variables leaves no zeros in non-financial FDI. Replacing log banking FDI by a 
dummy equal to one if banking FDI is larger than zero still only excludes 10% of possible 
destinations for non-financial FDI, although banking FDI is positive for only 33% of 
observations. This compares to as many as 55 percent zeroes in the 1986 cross Section of 
bilateral trade flows of Helpman et al. (2008). 
The interest is on estimating the effect of the censored variable banking FDI on the censored 
variable non-financial FDI, where separate models capture the non-financial sector's decision 
to invest (7) and the amount of FDI invested (5).  
  1 , 1 1 1 1 ln ln
NF B
it it i t i t it FDI FDI c v b g t - = + + + + X    (5) 
  2 2 2 2 ln
B
it it it i t it FDI Z c v b d t = + + + + X   (6) 
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0 if     0
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b d h m t
 + + + + + >
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+ + + + + £ 
X X
X X
.  (7) 
Equation (7) is the selection equation that determines selection into the sample of (5), where 
the conditional mean of individual unobserved effects in the selection equation (7) is a linear 
projection of the within means of the X and Z, following Mundlak (1978). To test for 
selection in equation (5) the method by Heckman (1979) is used by first obtaining 3 ˆ b , 3 ˆ d , 3 ˆ h , 
                                                 
32 This is sometimes also referred to as an 'incidental truncation problem' (Wooldridge, 2002). 
33 A benefit of this estimator over others such as for example Lewbel (2007) is that it parametrically 
estimates the selection equation which allows interpreting the difference between deciding to invest 
versus the amount invested and allows for explicit controls for the extensive margin. Lewbel (2007) 
proposes  to  estimate  (5)  in  first  differences  to  get  rid  of  the  fixed  effects  and  weighing  all  the 
observations for which  0
NF FDI > in the linear second stage by one over the conditional density of a 
regressor  that  is  conditionally  independent  of  unobservables  in  (7)  and  has  strong  support, 
encompassing the supports of the other variables. No assumptions need to be made on the functional 
form of equation (7). However, such a variable with strong support is not readily available.   A-8 
and 3 ˆ m from a probit regression of I
NF on X, Z and their within means and calculating the 
inverse Mills ratio 
( ) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) it it it i i t it it i i t Z Z Z Z l l f b d h m t b d h m t = + + + + F + + + + X X X X , where  () f ×  
denotes the standard normal density function and  () F ×  indicates the cumulative normal 
density function. Then, using the subsample for which  0
B FDI >  the following equation is 
estimated by 2SLS using as instruments Z and ˆ
it l for ln
B
it FDI  (adding ˆ
it l to equations (5) and 
(7)):  
  1 , 1 1 2 1 ˆ ln ln
NF B
it it i t it i t it FDI FDI c b g l g t e - = + + + + + X   (8) 
Although the non-linearity of the Mills ratio allows the equation to be just identified in 
principle, in practise a second instrument is needed to avoid multicollinearity among the IVs. 
Z is therefore expanded to include at least one instrument determining banking FDI and a 
second instrument determining selection into positive non-financial FDI. A simple t-test 
on 2 g provides a test for sample selection. For  2 0 g ¹  a correction for sample selection is 
needed, which for the Heckman estimator is simply (8), using the result in Wooldridge (2002) 
that instrumenting ln
B
it FDI  also corrects for non-random censoring in this variable. 
However, to deal with incidental truncation equation (8) requires further modification. 
Wooldridge (1995), suggests first estimating equation (7) and adding the collected Mills 
ratios to equation (5) in the following way, where  2... T t t are time dummies, together with the 
within means of the explanatory variables:  
  1 , 1 1 12 2 22 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ln ln ...  
NF B
it it i t i it it T it T t it FDI FDI c b g l g t l g t l g t e - = + + + + + + + + X .
34  (9) 
The result is presented in Table D1. Column (a) reports the estimates of the first stage probit 
model (7) where the volume of banking FDI is replaced by an indicator dummy equal to 1 if 
banking FDI is positive. The variables that determine entry in foreign markets are two 
observed fixed effects (a measure of remoteness and distance to the home market), the 
distance weighted level of GDP in surrounding host markets and an indicator of high cost-of-
entry host markets. So far the results suggest that non-financial FDI is on average of the 
horizontal variety, meaning that firms invest in host markets to jump trade costs. Such costs 
are higher for longer distances, predicting more FDI. On the other hand, countries with 
                                                 
34 If the  2 t g  are constant across t one can also simply include  ˆ
it l by itself.   A-9 
limited internal access as measured by the average distance to a coast or waterway may make 
its market potential less accessible and less attractive. Surrounding market potential could 
affect the investment decision if multinationals potentially intend to use the host market as an 
export platform. High cost-of-entry host markets are defined following Helpman et al. 
(2008). This dummy takes on the value 1 if the number of days plus the number of legal 
procedures to start up a business are above the median. It is expected that these affect the 
fixed costs of entry positively and therefore predict less FDI.
35 
This is indeed what column (a) of Table D1 finds. Long and many entry procedures, 
inaccessible internal markets and distant or small surrounding markets lower the probability 
of non-financial FDI. Although non-financial FDI is always positive if banking FDI is 
positive, there is no clear evidence that banking FDI makes it more likely that a multinational 
invests in a new host market, suggesting that banking FDI provides more benefits for the 
variable costs of investment or expansion in existing markets. To correct for possible 
endogeneity and non-random censoring of banking FDI it is instrumented again with 
measures of financial liberalization but also includes the inverse Mills ratio. Column (c) 
reports the second stage where banking FDI is instrumented and controls are added for the 
extensive margin as suggested by Helpman et al. (2008), which is a polynomial expansion of 
the predicted probability to invest. These controls (not reported) are jointly significant as 
reported by an F-test. The Mills ratio is significant in the second stage, and cannot reject the 
null of endogenous sample selection of the Wooldridge (1995) test.
36 Equation (9) is 
therefore estimated with the results given in column (d). The yearly inverse Mills ratios are 
jointly highly significant, giving us a final estimate that a 10% permanent increase in banking 
FDI results in 6% higher equilibrium level of non-financial FDI. Compared to regression (f) 
of Table 6 which does not control for selection bias banking FDI is more important than trade 
liberalization and the short run positive effects of growth are not robust. Transitory shocks 
also affect FDI positively in the short run, but the estimate is less precisely estimated at only 
90% confidence. 
                                                 
35 The data is from Djankov et al. (2002) and only observed for 1999, although used in Helpman et al. 
(2008) to (successfully) determine trade in 1986. This paper also assumes that legal procedures do not 
change much over time. However, the indicator for the monetary costs to set up a business (as a 
percentage of GNI) is not used because these probably change much more over time. Other regulatory 
changes that might affect the decision to invest are unfortunately not available. Official equity market 
openness from Bekaert et al. (2007), for example, covers 54 countries since 1980, but Dutch FDI is 
non-zero in 99.5% of these observations, leaving too little variation.  
36 As an imperfect test for the exclusion of the selection variables from the second stage there is no 
evidence that they significantly predict the amount of non-financial FDI.    A-10 










 (1) ln non-fin. FDI   (1) ln non-fin. FDI 




FDI (t-1)  long run  in  (1)  long run  in  (1) 
home banking FDI dummy (t-2)  0.068           
  (0.047)           
    0.304***  0.135*  0.267***  0.139  ln home banking FDI (t-1) 
(instrumented)      (0.060)  (0.079)  (0.069)  (0.084) 
ln non-financial FDI (t-1)      -0.486***  -0.065  -0.433***  -0.088* 
      (0.077)  (0.042)  (0.086)  (0.045) 
ln total population (t-1)  -0.355**  4.886**  -1.906***  -2.234  -1.622**  1.840 
  (0.149)  (2.029)  (0.703)  (8.036)  (0.744)  (7.312) 
Trade liberalization  (t-1)  0.055**  -0.970**  0.199  -0.157  0.234  0.090 
  (0.028)  (0.461)  (0.144)  (0.291)  (0.159)  (0.383) 
ln GDP per capita (t-2)  -0.027  0.144  0.514***  0.467**  0.429**  0.357 
  (0.029)  (0.493)  (0.176)  (0.188)  (0.173)  (0.217) 
0.031  0.336  -0.915**  0.160  -0.774*  0.297  Real exchange rate (t-1) 
(0.060)  (0.837)  (0.434)  (0.458)  (0.419)  (0.453) 
-0.046***            ln mean dist. to coast or river 
(0.011)           
0.054            ln distance (km) 
(0.049)           
0.605***            ln GDP surrounding  
market potential(t-1)  (0.214)           
-0.061**            Proc.+days to form business (= 
1 if > median)  (0.029)           
  -0.199*          Baking sector entry (t-1) 
    (0.109)         
  0.214**          Banking supervision (t-1)  
  (0.105)         
  0.171          Capital account transactions 
regarding fin. credits (t-1)    (0.112)         
Security markets (t-1)    0.545***         
    (0.185)         
Inverse Mills ratio (t-1)    -0.444  -4.811***  -1.231     
    (0.541)  (1.543)  (2.569)     
F test for joint sign. of controls 
for extensive margin      3.50***  2.14* 
F test for joint sign. of  
yearly inverse Mills ratios        128.64*** 
including within means of RHS 
variables  yes  no  no  no 
Observations (1;0)  2036;215  720  595  595 
R-squared, pseudo in (a)  0.426  0.582  0.320  0.388 
Number of countries  131  51  49  49 
Cragg-Donald F-stat.    16.37         
Robust test of OIR (p-value)      0.767  0.829 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year and country 
effects and constant term included in all models. Column (a) are marginal effects. Excluded instruments in 
italics. Controls for extensive margin: predicted outcome of column (a), its square and its cube.    A-11 
Appendix E: Sector-specific effects of banking on FDI 
This Section repeats the main specification of Section 6 for the effect of (instrumented) 
banking FDI on long run non-financial investment, where the dependent variable is split by 
sector. The dependent variable therefore becomes a column vector of 13 stacked sectors by 
52x18 country-years. Controlling for year, sector, country and sector-year fixed effects 
regression (a) shows the average positive and significant effect of banking FDI on non-
financial FDI.
37 Column (b) interacts the banking FDI variable with the sector dummies and 
shows that most sectors benefit significantly from banking FDI. In addition, columns (c) and 
(d) show the effect on the extensive margin using entry procedures interacted with the sector 
dummies as excluded instruments and a test for sample selection bias, respectively. The 
ranking of sectors is different for the extensive margin and there is no evidence for selection 
bias. 
Table E1: Which sectors benefit most from banking FDI? 





Dependent variable:  ln sector FDI ln sector FDI  sector FDI dummy  ln sector FDI 
0.280*          ln home banking FDI, 
instrumented  (t-1)  (0.143)         
Interactions  















  0.492***  0.186***  -0.001  0.392**  Real estate 
  (0.172)  (0.054)  (0.001)  (0.157) 
  0.403***  0.089*  -0.001**  0.267*  Transportation and 
communication    (0.142)  (0.053)  (0.001)  (0.154) 
  0.312  -0.152***  0.000  0.201  Utilities 
  (0.248)  (0.056)  (0.000)  (0.207) 
  0.307*  0.121**  -0.001  0.306*  Retail 
  (0.166)  (0.056)  (0.001)  (0.162) 
  0.301*  0.279***  -0.000  0.292*  Machines, electronics, 
automotive    (0.180)  (0.054)  (0.001)  (0.167) 
  0.288*  0.127**  -0.000  0.148  Business services, other 
services     (0.173)  (0.050)  (0.001)  (0.157) 
  0.273*  0.075  -0.002***  0.165  Other manufacturing (paper, 
textile, medical, furniture)    (0.166)  (0.052)  (0.000)  (0.152) 
  0.244*  0.281***  -0.000  0.199  Chemicals, rubber, plastics 
  (0.147)  (0.050)  (0.001)  (0.128) 
  0.183  0.071  -0.000  0.176  Natural resources extraction 
and refining    (0.164)  (0.052)  (0.001)  (0.161) 
Construction, installation    0.128  0.009  -0.000  -0.034 
                                                 
37 The standard errors are clustered on countries, years and sectors. Non-nested clustering is possible 
following the procedure by Cameron et al. (2010).   A-12 
  (0.186)  (0.050)  (0.001)  (0.173) 
  0.111  0.143***  0.001  0.064  Food processing, beverages, 
tobacco    (0.188)  (0.054)  (0.001)  (0.179) 
  -0.036  0.020  -0.000  -0.102  Private agents 
  (0.236)  (0.052)  (0.000)  (0.213) 
  -0.224  -0.117**  0.000  -0.368**  Agriculture, fisheries 
  (0.165)  (0.052)  (0.000)  (0.177) 
Inverse Mills ratio        -3.266 
        (2.008) 
Predicted prob. I>0        -1.366 
        (1.222) 
(Predicted prob. I>0)
2        0.504** 
        (0.212) 
(Predicted prob. I>0)
3        -0.053*** 
        (0.016) 
ln total population  -1.208*  -1.299*  -0.259*  -1.707** 
  (0.661)  (0.671)  (0.154)  (0.815) 
Trade liberalization  -0.283  -0.299  -0.007  -0.226 
  (0.421)  (0.413)  (0.029)  (0.343) 
ln GDP per capita (t-1)  0.283  0.312  0.058**  0.319 
  (0.382)  (0.379)  (0.023)  (0.376) 
Real exchange rate  0.243  0.231  0.003  0.129 
  (0.624)  (0.626)  (0.029)  (0.638) 
Institutions, 5 year initial  0.025  0.024  0.002  0.015 
  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.003)  (0.019) 
Observations  









Adj. R-squared  0.659  0.669  0.545  0.677 
Regressions include a constant, year, sector, country and sector-year effects. Standard errors 
clustered on year, sector and country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
variables ln third-country foreign banking assets (excl. local currency), ln host banking assets, 
and ln home lending, foreign currency were not significant in regression (b). 
 
 
 
 